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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from the first week in
October 1965 through the last week in November 1965 in the National
Reporter System.
JOHN F. BURKE
MICHAEL L. GOLDBERG
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-105. Territorial Application of the Act; Parties'
Power to Choose Applicable Law
LYLES V. UNION PLANTERS NAT'L BANK
393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1965)
Defendant, a Tennessee resident, purchased an automobile from a dealer
in Arkansas under a conditional sales contract which was assigned to the
plaintiff, a Tennessee bank. White the contract specified that the payments
were to be made at the office of the dealer or his assignee, it made no mention
of the law which was to govern the contract. Approximately five months after
the sale, the defendant moved to Arkansas and defaulted in his payments. In
a replevin action brought in Arkansas, the defendant answered that the finance
charge, which both parties agreed exceeded ten per cent, was usurious under
Arkansas law. The plaintiff contended that, under Section 1-105 of the Code,
the validity of the transaction should be determined according to Tennessee
Iaw. The lower court, accepting the plaintiff's contention, decided there was
no usury, but the supreme court reversed, holding that Arkansas law con-
trolled.
Since the parties had not specified which law was to govern the contract,
the court held that, under Arkansas law, the governing law in matters affect-
ing the validity of the contract was that of the place where the contract was
made. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that "even if it
could be said that the transaction 'bears a reasonable relation' to Tennessee,
nevertheless the parties did not agree that the law of Tennessee would
govern." The failure of the parties to select Tennessee law necessitated, in the
court's opinion, the application of Arkansas law.
The court cited Section 9-201 of the Code, which specifically mentions
the usury law of a state as an example of non-Code law which can invalidate
the terms of an otherwise valid security agreement.
COMMENT
Instead of minimizing the possibility of any reasonable relation to
Tennessee and emphasing the failure of the parties to agree that Tennessee law
should govern the contract, the court should have proceeded on the basis that
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the contract did bear a reasonable relation to both Arkansas and Tennessee.
In that case, under Section 1-105(1), the court would have been free to apply
the Arkansas Code if an appropriate relation to Arkansas could have been
established. The fact that the contract was executed in Arkansas, that the
originally designated place of payment was in Arkansas, that the plaintiff's
assignor was an Arkansas company and that the defendant was an Arkansas
resident at the time of the suit would seem to be sufficient to establish this
appropriate relation to Arkansas and allow the court to interpret the contract
according to the Code.
The defendant's claim of usury should have then caused the court to
turn to Section 9-201 of the Code which denies validity to practices, such as
usury, illegal under state law. In the face of this defense, the validity of the
contract should have been determined by the non-Code law of the state. In
doing so, the court would then have been forced to decide whether to apply
only the usury statutes of Arkansas, or the whole law of Arkansas—including
its conflict of laws rule. In the present case, however, the application of either
alternative would not have changed the result.
J.F.B.
SECTION 1-210. General Definitions
CITIZENS NAT'L BANK V. FORT LEE SAV. & LOAN ASS'N [Section 1-201(19)]
213 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965) 	 [Section 1-201(20)]
Annotated under Section 3-302, infra. 	 [Section 1-201(25)]
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
WILLIAMS V. WALKER-THOMAS FURNITURE Co.
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
Plaintiff, a retail furniture dealer, and defendant buyer executed a retail
installment contract for the purchase of a stereo set in April 1962. Under the
contract, the periodic payments were termed "rent" and title was to pass from
the plaintiff to the defendant when the total payments equalled the purchase
price. The contract provided for the plaintiff's right to repossess the goods in
the event of a default in payments. Furthermore, according to the contract,
if the defendant purchased an additional item while an unpaid balance
remained outstanding on an earlier purchase, all future payments were to
be credited pro-rata to the balance remaining in each account. The court
ruled that the effect of this provision was to keep a balance due on every
item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever purchased, was
liquidated. The defendant defaulted on a payment on the stereo set, and the
plaintiff brought suit to replevy all purchases made on a series of installment
contracts since 1958. The defendant claimed that the contract was uncon-
scionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The court of general sessions
granted judgment for the plaintiff, and the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals affirmed on the ground that it was powerless to do otherwise in the
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